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It Takes Two:
The Incidence and Effectiveness of co-CEOs

1. Introduction
In spite of extensive interdisciplinary analysis on the effect of senior corporate
executive management on corporate decisions and performance (e.g., Barnard (1938),
Selznick (1957), Rosen (1990), Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Wasserman (2003), Adams,
Almeida, and Ferreira (2005), Tichy and Cohen (1997), Denis and Denis (1995), Weisbach
(1995), Parrino (1997), Malmendier and Tate (2005), Dahya, Garcia, and van Bommel
(2009)), the present literature fails to examine the effect that alternative structures of CEO
leadership might have on corporate performance and behavior. More specifically, existing
empirical literature ignores CEO leadership models that involve the sharing of executive
power and how such arrangements affect the ability of a CEO to influence corporate behavior.
In this study, we examine the effect of shared power on corporate governance, corporate
value, and performance by focusing on the case of co-CEOs. We use the Alvarez and
Svejenova (2005) definition of co-CEOs as “two executives who, over time, perform the top
job together in a coordinated fashion and are held jointly accountable for the company or
unit’s results.”
Empirically, the ability of senior management to influence corporate behavior is
usually measured indirectly, with most studies using specific events or proxies. Denis and
Denis (1995), Weisbach (1995), Parrino (1997), and Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino (2004)
focus on the valuation impact of senior management turnover while Malmendier and Tate
(2005) analyze the effect of managerial overconfidence on corporate merger and acquisition
decisions. Adams et al. (2005) use several proxies for CEO power and find that stocks exhibit
1

greater variability for firms run by powerful CEOs. Easterwood and Raheja (2008) examine
the influence that CEOs have relative to the board of directors when the firm is
underperforming. Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2008) construct CEO salary as a percentage
of the aggregate compensation paid to the firm’s top 5 executives as a proxy for CEO
centrality and find that CEO centrality affects firm performance.1 In contrast to this previous
research, our study provides a unique opportunity for a direct examination of management’s
ability to influence corporate activity by an analysis of the impact of an alternative leadership
structure.
The presence of two individuals simultaneously serving as the CEO of a firm has the
potential to influence the firm’s decision-making in ways that are very different from that of a
solitary CEO. First, co-CEOs often bring complementary skills to the firm’s senior leadership
position, providing a range of competencies and perspectives that might not be present in a
single individual.

A co-CEOship also allows for the simultaneous presence of senior

leadership at locations that are separated by time and distance or the simultaneous
examination of two different issues of strategic importance.
Pearce and Conger (2003) argue that co-leadership is justifiable in many
circumstances since senior managers of complex organizations usually do not possess all the
skills and competencies necessary for successful leadership. Consequently, more than one
leader might be needed to complete the tasks assigned to the CEO. Similarly, O’Toole,
Galbraith, and Lawler (2002) posit that two CEOs are better than one when the challenges
facing a firm are so complex that they require a set of skills too broad to be possessed by any
one individual.
1

Exceptions to these approaches are studies by Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Frank and Goyal (2007) who
analyze the effect of management on firm outcomes by using fixed effects in their regression analyses to control
for the effect of managers.
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The presence of co-CEOs, however, might also result in sub-optimal or disjointed
decision-making by the firm. Mintzberg (1989) and Hackman (2002) argue that co-CEO
arrangements are plagued by coordination problems and interpersonal conflicts. The strong
egos and personalities of CEOs can lead to friction and competition for power between
individuals. Any inability of co-CEOs to compromise can cause loss of corporate focus and
conflicted decision-making. Because of these factors, Alvarez and Svejenova (2005) view the
co-CEO structure as inherently instable and generally not sustainable over a long period of
time.
In this study, we pose four broad research questions as they relate to the existence of
co-CEOs. Our first question concerns the extent to which a co-CEO structure exists among
U.S. public corporations. Although such arrangements might be common among family
firms, the practice of co-CEOs for the broader set of publicly traded firms remains
unexplored. The literature appears to assume that all firms are led by solitary CEOs.
Our second research question examines the factors that might account for the presence
of a co-CEO structure within a firm. The existing literature only hints at what might explain
such a leadership arrangement. O’Toole et al. (2002) and Pearce and Conger (2003) argue
that co-leadership is the correct organizational structure for complex organizations.
Wasserman, Nohria, and Anand (2001) imply that two CEOs might be more appropriate for
firms in which the CEO’s decisional power is more influential, such as companies with low
levels of debt, high amounts of cash, or operating in highly concentrated industries. On the
other hand, more powerful CEOs might be less willing to share leadership (Hackman (2002)).
Beyond these factors, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that companies involved in
mergers or family affiliations are more likely to appoint co-CEOs.
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We examine the

significance of these variables later in our empirical analysis.
The third research question is related to our analysis of co-CEO determinants and
investigates the nature of a firm’s governance structure when corporate executive leadership
is shared. It might be that a co-CEOship facilitates the concentration of managerial power
within a small group of executives, leading to entrenchment. In this case, we anticipate that
existing governance mechanisms are weak and that the co-CEOs are better able to capture the
perquisites of an entrenched management. Alternatively, co-CEOs might serve as mutual
monitors and the joint leadership of two co-CEOs functions as a substitute for more
traditional corporate governance mechanisms. Kandel and Lazear (1992) note that when
organizations cannot easily monitor the actions of their agents, they may rely on a process of
mutual monitoring to achieve the desired accountability. Additionally, co-CEOs with
complementary expertise can supplement or even substitute the advising provided by other
board directors. Our logistic regression analysis suggests that co-CEOs offer mutual
monitoring and compensate for the reduced advising levels provided by other board members.
Moreover, our empirical results regarding compensation levels and the effect of co-CEOs on
performance are inconsistent with managerial entrenchment and suggest mutual monitoring.
Our model of the decision to appoint co-CEOs is robust to possible endogeneity with the
firm’s existing governance structure, further supporting the substitute monitoring and advising
functions of co-CEOs.
Our last research question focuses on the ability of co-CEOs to provide effective
leadership to the firm. Given the potential for shared leadership to impact corporate decisionmaking, we examine what effect the presence of co-CEOs might exert on both firm
performance and value.
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Our initial descriptive analysis of co-CEOs provides several interesting results. First,
we observe that the average length of co-CEOs is approximately 4.5 years, which is
comparable to that of solitary CEOs (Shivdasani and Yermack (1999)), suggesting that this
arrangement is more stable than previously believed. We also find that co-CEOships are
broadly distributed across industry types. Finally, we observe that co-CEOs generally
complement each other in terms of educational background or executive responsibilities.
Our empirical findings show that the most significant determinant of co-CEO
arrangements is M&A activity. Firms involved in a merger will sometimes decide to appoint
the CEOs of the acquirer and target as co-CEOs of the new firm. Such an arrangement can be
used to accelerate merger approval and to ease the implementation of the merger. We also
find that companies in which CEOs have more discretionary power (e.g., firms with lower
leverage or operating in a more concentrated industry) are more likely to adopt a shared
leadership arrangement. We do not find that family firms or more complex firms are more
likely to appoint co-CEOs to lead them.
We obtain important results concerning the governance structure of firms with coCEOs. We find that the power of the CEOs, the percent of independent directors, institutional
ownership, and the level of corporate debt are all inversely related to the probability of a coCEOship. Moreover, the lower number of independent directors for firms adopting coCEOships requires most of these directors to be members of audit, compensation, and
nominating committees leaving less directors to offer advising (according to the measure
introduced by Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2009)). We also establish that there are important
differences in compensation between co-CEOs and solitary CEOs, with co-CEOs receiving
proportionately significantly less incentive compensation than solitary CEOs. We conclude
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from these results that the mutual monitoring and advising provided by shared executive
leadership might substitute for more traditional governance mechanisms.
Our results regarding the determinants of shared leadership help explain why coCEOships are not a common organizational form. Firms with lower leverage, a more limited
corporate focus, less independent boards, lower institutional ownership and a higher level of
merger activity are more likely to appoint co-CEOs. Only a limited number of firms are able
to satisfy these conditions. Particularly, past merger and acquisition activity has the greatest
influence on creating a co-CEOship. The relative infrequency of M&As for the average U.S.
public corporation provides a partial explanation why co-CEOships rarely occur. Only 3.5%
of the firm-year COMPUSTAT observations experience at least one M&A transaction over a
three-year period whereas the corresponding percentage for our sample of co-CEO firms is
23%. Further understanding of the relative rarity of co-CEOs might reside in behavioral
explanations related to interpersonal conflict, hubris, and managerial over-confidence (e.g,
Roll (1986), Hackman (2002), and Malmendier and Tate (2005)).
We also examine the market reaction and performance effects resulting from a coCEOship. We find that there is a positive market reaction to the announcement of co-CEOs to
lead a firm. We discover that the presence of co-CEOs is associated with a higher market-tobook ratio (MB). This result suggests that the design of the leadership structure, such as a coCEO arrangement, can influence firm value.2
Our findings also contribute to our understanding of the relation between top
executive functions and firm activity in two ways. First, it complements and supports studies
2

There is no inconsistency between this result and the mutual monitoring of co-CEOs which substitutes for other
governance mechanisms. Corporate governance is only one of the factors that affect a firm’s value. Co-CEOs
might improve firm value by complementary expertise and by mutual advising. This is suggested by our finding
that 90% of our sample co-CEOships demonstrate complementarity in CEO education, job responsibilities, or
both.
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such as Bertrand and Schoar (2003) which report a significant managerial influence on firm
policies and behaviors.

Second, it shows for the first time that a specific executive

organizational structure can have a significant impact on firm value.
It is important to note that our findings regarding corporate value do not imply that
more firms should adopt a shared leadership structure. We base our valuation analysis on
propensity score matched samples and therefore compare the firm’s market-to-book ratio with
co-CEO leadership to the unobserved market-to-book ratio that would have occurred with a
solitary CEO. Improvements in market-to-book ratios only show that firms with shared
leadership improved their valuation. Our results do not imply that any firm could appoint coCEOs and enjoy higher value.

2. The determinants of co-CEOs and their relation to governance and firm value
In this section we further develop the research questions which guide our empirical
investigation of co-CEOs in U.S. firms. These questions focus on the incidence and
determinants of co-CEOship in the U.S., the nature of the firm’s governance when senior
corporate leadership is shared, and the effect of shared leadership on firm performance and
value.
2.1. Determinants of shared leadership
O’Toole et al. (2002) and Pearce and Conger (2003) argue that complex organizations
might benefit from the complementary skills of two CEOs. For example, multinational
companies might hire a CEO to lead the domestic operations of the firm, and a second CEO
to manage its international operations. Furthermore, diversified companies could benefit
from co-CEOs that have expertise in different industries. Similar to Coles, Daniel, and
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Naveen (2008), we measure firm complexity by firm size and the number of business
segments. If complex firms are more likely to benefit from co-CEOs, then these proxies for
complexity should be positively related to the probability that a firm has a shared corporate
leadership structure.
Companies in which the CEO’s decisional power is more influential might also benefit
from co-CEO leadership. Specifically, Wasserman et al. (2001) argue that when the external
environment, perhaps due to high levels of industry concentration, provides firms with few
opportunities, CEOs must make the most of each opportunity. This increases the overall
influence of CEOs on firm performance. Further, they note that CEOs have a larger impact
on firm performance when financial resources are abundant. Firms with low levels of debt
have future borrowing capabilities and are less constrained by covenants while those with
large amounts of cash have uncommitted resources available to the CEO. The presence of
slack resources allows a CEO to pursue valuable projects or to waste capital on poor
investments. In either case, the CEO’s resource decisions will impact firm performance. The
conjecture that firms with larger free cash flows and less debt are more likely to benefit from
co-CEOs is also consistent with Jensen (1986). Jensen contends that agency conflicts are
more pronounced when interest and principal payment amounts are smaller, and free cash
flow is greater. Therefore, the mutual monitoring provided by co-CEOs might reduce agency
costs and could benefit high free-cash-flow, low debt firms.
Based on these arguments, we hypothesize a series of relations. First, we anticipate
that leverage is inversely related to the probability of shared corporate leadership. We
estimate the firm’s debt level by its long-term debt to total assets ratio (D). High amounts of
cash suggest greater free cash flow and correspondingly more resources for the CEO to
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direct towards preferred investments or perquisite consumption. Thus, we hypothesize that
firms with higher levels of free cash flow (FCF) are more likely to have co-CEOs. Because
industry concentration implies that there might be fewer investment opportunities available
to the firm, thereby increasing the importance of each strategic decision by the CEO, we
hypothesize that a firm’s corresponding industry Herfindahl index (HERF) will positively
affect its likelihood of having co-CEOs.
According to Mintzberg (1989) and Hackman (2002) the power struggle between coCEOs is the larger limitation of this organizational structure. As a consequence, more
powerful CEOs might be more reluctant to accept to share their leadership. Similar to
Adams et al. (2005), we measure CEO power with an indicator equal to 1 if the CEOs are the
only insiders of the firm. We expect this indicator variable to be negatively related to coCEO incidence.
2.2. Governance of firms with co-CEOs
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) present a model of corporate governance based on the
power struggle between the CEO and the board. They argue that boards of directors are less
effective at monitoring CEOs who possess high levels of power and prestige. This reduction
in the board’s monitoring ability might be more pronounced when the leadership of the firm
is shared by two CEOs. Thus, co-leadership might concentrate more authority with the
CEOs, and further weaken the board’s ability to provide oversight. This can result in an
increase in the degree of managerial entrenchment. Alternatively, co-CEOs might function
as mutual monitors. In this case, co-leadership substitutes for the monitoring of CEOs
provided by the board of directors or institutional equity ownership.

In addition to

monitoring, board directors also provide advising to the firm’s management (Adams (2009)).
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If co-CEOs complement each other in expertise and in their job responsibility (as confirmed
by our univariate analysis) there might be in less need for advising by other board directors.
To empirically examine the nature of the relation between the board and the co-CEOs,
we introduce several different variables into our analysis. We measure the monitoring quality
of the board by the proportion of independent board members (PERINDEP). Similar to
Faleye et al. (2009), we measure the advising strength of the board based on how many
independent directors are free from committee work (less involved in monitoring). Our
advising measure (ADVISINGBOARD) equals 1 if only a minority of independent board
members serve on at least two of the three major committees of the board (audit,
compensation and nominating). We measure the extent of outside monitoring with the
percentage of institutional ownership (INSTOWN). The design of compensation contracts for
senior executives can be used as another governance device within the firm. Consequently,
we examine the nature of co-CEO compensation by comparing it with that of solitary CEOs.
Most importantly, we analyze the extent to which incentive based compensation is utilized in
the payment of co-CEOs. To the extent that co-CEOs provide mutual monitoring, we expect
that less incentive-based compensation is necessary.
2.3. Effect of co-leadership on firm performance
This examination of co-CEOs provides an ideal laboratory in which to study the direct
impact of top management on firm value and performance. By comparing the performance of
firms led by co-CEOs to that of similar companies with solitary CEOs, we evaluate the effect
that this alternative leadership structure has on valuation and operating performance. We
measure valuation with the market-to-book ratio (M/B) and operating performance with the
return on assets (ROA).
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3. Sample construction and data description
We construct our sample by searching ProQuest for press releases and articles that
mention co-CEOs between 1998 and 2008. We then eliminate non-U.S. companies, private
companies, and public companies not covered by either CRSP or COMPUSTAT. After this
further screening, our sample consists of 111 firms with a total of 358 firm-year
observations.3

We then collect co-CEO information, board characteristics, and insider

ownership from annual proxy statements, accounting data from COMPUSTAT, and stock
prices and returns from CRSP.4 Data regarding the characteristics of CEO compensation for
our co-CEO firms is obtained from annual corporate proxy statements and the EXECUCOMP
database. Our sample includes some very large firms such as Verizon Communications and
Citigroup, as well as highly recognizable companies such as Bed, Bath & Beyond, and
American Eagle Outfitters.
The small size of our sample is not inconsistent with those studies appearing in the
literature that examine specialized events or transactions. Because these events often occur
infrequently, the empirical analysis is executed with samples much smaller than the large
panel data sets of traditional corporate finance studies. For instance, Chalmers, Dann, and
Harford (2002) construct a sample of 72 IPO firms to examine the relation between the
purchase of D&O insurance by corporate insiders and subsequent performance. Fich and
White (2005) examine the issue of why CEOs reciprocally sit on each other boards using a
sample of only 70 CEOs. Dunbar and Foerster (2008) investigate the performance of IPOs
that were initially withdrawn with a sample of 138 offerings.
To assess the degree of complementarity in the education and executive

3

The co-CEO pairs in our sample are 118 because for 7 of our firms at least one of the two co-CEOs change
during the sample period.
4
We retrieve the corporate governance data for the control sample, needed for our logistic regressions, from the
IRRC – Risk Metrics database.

11

responsibilities of the co-CEOs, we access a number of different sources. We first search
Marquis’ Who’s Who to obtain relevant biographical data for our sample co-CEOs. We then
examine the firm’s annual reports and proxy statements for each of the years of the coCEOship’s existence.

Further, we search the firm’s website for additional information

regarding the educational achievements and professional assignments of the co-CEOs. We
also use search engines such as Google, Yahoo, and Factiva to identify relevant press releases
regarding our sample co-CEOs.
We obtain a description of each co-CEO’s job duties from several sources. Based
upon a review of annual reports, proxy statements, and various press releases, we are able to
ascertain the specific responsibilities assigned to each of the co-CEOs.

Overlapping or

similar responsibilities in a given area are coded as an uncomplimentary co-CEOship. When
information regarding the executive responsibilities of each co-CEO is unavailable, the coCEOship is excluded from this analysis.

4. The extent and nature of shared executive leadership
4.1. Profile of the sample firms
Table 1 contains the initial descriptive statistics for our sample firms and helps
establish the relative incidence of co-CEOs among U.S. industries. In panel A, we observe
that the 111 sample firms are distributed over seven, one-digit Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) industry groupings. Manufacturers represent nearly a third of the sample
(30%), while about a quarter (23%) is contained in service industries. Approximately another
quarter (25%) of our sample is located in finance, insurance and real estate. The remaining
sample firms are distributed across wholesale-retail trade (13%), transportation and
communication (6%), mining and construction (3%) and public administration (1%).
12

In panel B we examine circumstances surrounding the creation of co-CEOships among
our sample firms. We determine that one fifth of the co-CEOships are associated with merger
and acquisition (M&A) activity. These co-CEOs arrangements are finalized at the completion
of a merger by nominating the CEOs of the two merging companies as co-CEOs of the new
company. The non-merger related circumstances include family succession influences (25%),
the existence of multiple corporate founders (15%), and its use to smooth the transition
between an incumbent CEO near retirement and a new incoming CEO (9%).5
We examine the duration of co-CEOships in panel C. We observe that at both the firm
and individual level, the average tenure of a co-CEOship is about 4.5 years. This result
suggests that co-CEOs have tenures not much shorter than those of solitary CEOs as reported
by Shivdasani and Yermack (1999).

Interim co-CEOships (those put in place just for

transitioning between a retiring CEO and the successor) are the shortest, with an average of
about one year. Co-CEOships due to mergers are also quite short with an average of 2.4
years. This result suggests that two CEOs joined together as a result of a merger might launch
a power struggle that reduces the length of their shared tenure.
In Panel D we present the role played by co-CEOs on the board of directors of their
firms. In the great majority of our firm-year observations (93%), both co-CEOs sit on the
board of directors. In 84% of our firm-year observations, at least one of the two co-CEOs is
the chair of the board. These results provide preliminary support for our hypothesis that coCEO mutual monitoring substitutes for other CEO monitoring mechanisms such as separation
between the CEO and board chair positions.

5

The incidence of family firms in our sample is comparable to the proportion of family firms among all public
US corporations. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that over 35 percent of S&P 500 firms are family controlled;
Gadhoum, Lang, and Young (2005) observe that approximately 25 percent of U.S. corporations is controlled and
managed by a family.
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4.2. Complementarity within the CEO dyad
The presence of complementarity can be a motivating force for the creation of a coCEOship and might help explain the subsequent performance of the CEO dyad. In this
section we examine the extent to which complementarity exists between the co-CEOs in terms
of educational achievement and executive responsibilities. We define complementarity as the
presence of off-setting skills, abilities or experiences within the co-CEOship.
We begin our analysis in Table 2 with a series of descriptive statistics regarding the
education level and academic fields of study for our sample co-CEOs. In panel A we observe
that 56.5% of co-CEOs possess a graduate degree while another 40.2% hold a bachelor’s
degree. Only about 3.3% of our sample co-CEOs failed to earn a college degree. In panel B
we analyze the field of study for the highest education level attained by our sample co-CEOs.
We observe that the MBA is the most popular graduate degree and is the most frequently
earned degree overall. Over half of the co-CEOs hold an MBA. Business is the most popular
undergraduate field of study, with almost 45% of the co-CEOs majoring in this discipline. In
Panel C we present the highest educational level of co-CEO pairs. For the majority of our coCEO pairs (69.7%), at least one co-CEO has a graduate degree.
In Table 3 we examine complementarity among co-CEOs in both their field of
academic study and the assignment of executive responsibilities. Our use of educational
achievement as a measure of complementarity within a co-CEOship is justified to the extent
that formal education is associated with an individual gaining the knowledge, abilities, and
skills that will ultimately be useful as a senior executive.
Educational complementarity occurs when one of the co-CEOs has at least one
academic degree different from the other co-CEO. The findings in panel A of Table 3 suggest
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that educational complementarity is extensive among our sample co-CEOs. Nearly threequarters of our co-CEO dyads possess at least one different academic degree between them.
Panel B contains our analysis of complementarity based upon the responsibilities
assigned to each co-CEO. This complementarity captures the ability of a co-CEO to generate
efficiencies in the management of the firm by eliminating redundant supervision and
assigning oversight for an area to the best qualified co-CEO.
Panel B shows that most co-CEOships are structured so that executive assignments are
complementary in nature and that overlap in responsibilities is eliminated. This suggests that
co-CEOships might be able to generate managerial efficiencies by their coordinated
assignment of executive oversight responsibilities. Yet, a significant portion of our coCEOships (i.e, 37.2%) remains uncomplementary with regards to job responsibilities. This
suggests that joint or overlapping responsibilities continue to remain an important way of
structuring senior executive functions for many co-CEOships. Internal politics, incomplete
expertise, or merger negotiations might be among the factors that account for this redundant
oversight. Indeed, in untabulated results, we find that 68% of our sample firms adopting a coCEO structure as the result of a merger have an uncomplementary assignment of executive
responsibilities.
In panel C, we examine the extent of joint complementarity in the field of study and
the assignment of executive responsibilities. We observe that 42.6% of our co-CEOships
demonstrate complementarity in both academic discipline and supervisory duties. Nearly
another third of our sample exhibits complementarity in academic preparation, but without a
corresponding complementarity in executive responsibilities. The remaining quarter of our
sample (25.9%) that is not complementary regarding the field of academic study is
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approximately evenly distributed between the complementary and uncomplementary
assignment of executive responsibilities. Only 11% of the co-CEOships in our sample fail to
demonstrate any type of complementarity.

5. Determinants of shared leadership
In this section we examine the determinants of shared leadership. We examine what
financial and industry characteristics might explain a firm’s decision to adopt a co-CEO
structure. We also analyze the nature of the firm’s governance when corporate executive
leadership is shared. To begin our analysis, we construct two samples of co-CEO firms. The
first is our aggregate set of firms with co-CEOs. The second sample excludes those firms
whose co-CEOship is the result of a merger. This allows us to control for the unique
governance or negotiation terms often associated with a merger that might lead to the creation
of co-CEOs. We also estimate several different specifications of logistic regressions to
capture the simultaneous effect of various factors in the decision to create co-CEOs.
5.1. Univariate examination of shared leadership
In Table 4 we provide a comparison of median values of possible determinants of a
co-CEO leadership structure between the entire sample, the non M&A subsample, and a
control sample consisting of all COMPUSTAT firms with solitary CEOs.
We observe a number of important differences between the co-CEO firms and those
that operate with a single CEO. First, we note that co-CEO firms are larger than the solitary
CEO firm as measured by the market value of equity. This result holds regardless whether the
M&A firms are included or not. Even the non-merger co-CEO firms are about three times as
large as the solitary CEO firms. Co-CEO firms also have higher leverage and a greater
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number of business segments. These results, however, appear to be driven by the M&A
subsample firms; when we exclude the merger-related co-CEO firms, the degree of financial
leverage and the number of business segments are not significantly different from the solitary
CEO sample.6
We also observe some important differences in board structure between co-CEO firms
and the control firms. Boards of the co-CEO firms have fewer independent directors and
those directors are less available to offer advising. The co-CEO firms, however, tend to have
a higher level of institutional equity ownership. Firms that adopt a co-CEOship structure are
also less likely to have CEOs as the only insiders of the board (CEOPOWER).
Finally, we observe that the co-CEO firms operate in more concentrated industries
than solitary CEO firms. This result is consistent with the implications of Wasserman et al
(2001) that co-CEO arrangements might be more valuable in concentrated industries, where
CEO decision-making has the potential to make a greater impact.
5.2. Multivariate analysis
In Table 5 we present the results from our multivariate analysis of the relation between
firm characteristics and the presence of co-CEOs. We design our regression analysis such
that the dependent variable is equal to one when a firm is managed by two CEOs and zero
otherwise. We estimate several different models which include or exclude controls for year
and industry fixed effects.
We recognize that the relation between governance characteristics such as board size,
number of independent directors, institutional ownership, and the presence of co-CEOs might
be endogenous.

Governance characteristics can, among other factors, determine the

6

In a multivariate setting leverage is negatively related to the probability of appointing co-CEOs after
controlling for the M&A status of the firm.
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probability of shared CEO leadership.

Alternatively, the presence of co-CEOs might

influence the design of a firm’s corporate governance. We control for this potential bilateral
causality by estimating a set of logistic regressions in which the independent variables are
lagged by one year. As a robustness check, we estimate a set of instrumental variables (IV)
probit regressions in which we instrument our governance variables with their one-year
lagged counterparts. These results are discussed in Section 8.
Table 5 confirms the existence of a number of significant variables related to the
presence of a co-CEOship. We find that smaller companies are more likely to have co-CEOs.
This result is the opposite of what found in the univariate analysis presented in Table 4. The
governance variables for the single-CEO firms are retrieved from IRRC–Risk Metrics. This
database covers a limited set of firms, mostly large.

The restriction imposed by our

governance database is likely responsible for the negative coefficient of the size variable. We
observe that the existence of M&A activity exerts a positive and significant influence on the
probability of a co-CEO. Companies with lower levels of debt are also more likely to have
co-CEOs as are firms operating in more concentrated industries or with greater free cash flow.
Thus, we find that firms in which CEO decision-making is more influential are more likely to
have shared executive leadership. This result is consistent with Wasserman et al. (2001) that
companies in which the CEOs have more decisional influence might benefit from co-CEO
leadership. However, firms in which CEOs have more power on a governance standpoint
(being the only insider on the board) are less likely to adopt a shared leadership structure as
evidenced by the negative sign and significance of our CEO power indicator variable.
All of the governance variables (i.e., percentage of independent directors, board
advising, and institutional ownership) are statistically significant and suggest a direct
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causality from a firm’s governance characteristics to the decision to hire co-CEOs. We
observe that the percentage of independent directors on the board is negatively related to the
probability of co-CEOs. This is consistent with the substitute governance effect and our
univariate results regarding board independence. Equity ownership by institutional investors,
an important source of external monitoring, is inversely related to the likelihood of having coCEOs.

Further, leverage is negatively related to the probability of co-CEO leadership,

suggesting that any decrease in monitoring by creditors is offset with a greater probability of
the firm selecting co-CEOs. Finally, the advising board variable is negative and significant
suggesting that firms with less advising directors are more likely to implement shared
leadership. Overall, the findings for these variables support the argument that co-CEOs can
substitute, at least partially, for other corporate governance mechanisms.7
The negative sign and significance of the advising variable does not directly imply that
these boards provide better monitoring. These boards have less independent directors than the
average COMPUSTAT firm and therefore the majority must be committee members just to
populate such committees. Our results show that boards of firms that decide to appoint coCEOs have fewer independent directors than the average firm. This result affects both the
monitoring and advising activities of the board. Overall, the sign and significance of the
coefficients of our logit regressions suggest that co-CEOs substitute for board advising as well
as various devices for the internal and external monitoring of CEOs. .
The empirical analyses in Table 5 suggest an explanation why co-CEOships are
7

In an alternative model specification described in our robustness analysis, we add a family indicator variable.
We find that family is not a significant determinant of the decision to appoint co-CEOs. In an untabulated
analysis we add the Gompers, Iishi, and Metrick (2003) index. However, only a small portion of our sample
firms are covered by the IRRC database, limiting the statistical power of this test. When we estimate this model
across the IRRC subsample we fail to find statistical significance for the coefficient of the governance index
variable.
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uncommon. Our results show that relatively lower leverage, narrower firm focus, larger and
less independent board structure, lower institutional ownership and greater merger activity
increase the likelihood of shared executive leadership. Only a small number of firms can
satisfy these conditions. Particularly, past merger and acquisition activity appear to have a
dominant influence on the likelihood that a co-CEOship is created. The relative infrequency
of merger activity for the average U.S. public firm provides partial insight into why coCEOships remain an unusual phenomenon.

Only 3.5% of the COMPUSTAT firm-year

observations have at least one M&A transaction in the past three fiscal years, whereas this
percentage is 23% for the co-CEO sample firms. These findings suggest that co-CEOships
continue to remain relevant as an alternative governance mechanism, but to a smaller set of
firms.
We further examine the nature of changes in the likelihood of a co-CEOship to better
understand the effect of past merger activity. Because logistic models are linear in the logistic
transformation of probability, but not in probability itself, we evaluate the other control
variables at fixed values to compute base case probabilities. For these estimates, we evaluate
all other variables at their sample medians and evaluate the merger activity indicator variable
at zero. For the base case, the probability of having a co-CEO is 6%. When the merger
activity dummy is evaluated at a value of 1, the probability of having a co-CEO becomes
13%, implying an increase by a factor of more than two.

6. Relative co-CEO compensation
There are two questions regarding co-CEO compensation that we investigate in this
section. The first concerns the total amount of compensation paid to co-CEOs. That is, are co-
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CEOs twice as costly as a solitary CEO or are they proportionally less expensive? If the
existence of co-CEOs increases managerial entrenchment and agency conflicts, then co-CEO
compensation is likely to be proportionately higher than that of solitary CEOs. Alternatively,
if the mutual monitoring derived of co-CEOs is an effective governance mechanism, then coCEO compensation might be proportionately less than solitary CEO compensation.
The second question concerns the percentage of compensation that is incentive based.
Is co-CEO compensation more or less incentive based than that of solitary CEOs? The mutual
monitoring of co-CEOs might reduce agency conflict and require less incentive-based
compensation on an individual basis. Alternatively, if the presence of co-CEOs shifts power
from the board to executive management, then more incentive-based compensation might be
needed to reduce agency conflicts.
Table 6 contains our analysis of co-CEO compensation. In this table we compare coCEO compensation with single CEO compensation for the same firm in the year prior and the
year following the existence of a co-CEOship. Median values are reported for all
compensation statistics. All dollar amounts presented in the table are inflation adjusted in
year 2000 dollars.
We observe in panel A that co-CEOs as a team are more expensive than the traditional
solitary CEO. We find, however, that the co-CEO team is not twice as expensive as a single
CEO. Median total cash compensation for co-CEOs is 98% higher than that of a solitary
CEO. Larger discounts apply to other components of compensation for the co-CEO team.
Salary is only 82% higher while the bonus is only 52% greater. More surprisingly, the
Wilcoxon test of the median shows that the two co-CEOs together are awarded fewer options
and stock grants, with a lower dollar value than solitary CEOs. This difference is consistent
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with the reduced need for incentive compensation as suggested by the mutual monitoring
hypothesis.
In panel B we examine the various compensation components for the co-CEOs on an
individual basis. Consistent with our results for the co-CEO team, we find that co-CEOs
individually are paid less than solitary CEOs. The median total cash compensation for coCEOs is 99% of that for single CEOs, while salary is only 91% as high. The median bonus
awarded a co-CEO is 12% lower than that of solitary CEOs. This difference, however, is not
statistically significant. Lower cash compensation for co-CEOs might be explained by the
fact that co-CEOs share managerial responsibilities and workload.
We also observe in panel B that solitary CEOs receive significantly more incentive
compensation than co-CEOs. The mean dollar value of option grants for solitary CEOs is over
two and half times as large as that for co-CEOs. The raw number of option grants for solitary
CEOs is also over twice as large as that for co-CEOs. When combined with the incentivebased compensation results reported in panel A, we conclude that incentive-based
compensation is used less often to reward co-CEOs.

This result is consistent with the

contention that co-CEOs monitor each other, thereby reducing the need for incentive based
compensation to reduce agency costs.8
In untabulated results, we further investigate the use of incentive compensation by
comparing the bonus-to-salary and bonus-to-total cash compensation ratios between solitary
and co-CEOs. We find that the bonus is nearly 45% as large as the salary for solitary CEOs
compared to only 32.2% for co-CEOs, although not statistically significant. The
corresponding value for bonus-to-total compensation is 31.4% (solitary CEO) and 24.7% (co-

8

We also replicate our compensation tests for the M&A sub-sample. The results are not significantly different
from those generated with the entire sample.
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CEO). These results hold whether the co-CEOs are treated as a team or separately. We also
find that the difference between the higher paid co-CEO and the lower-paid co-CEO is not
significant.
For the sub-sample of our firms that are covered by EXECUCOMP we also perform
other untabulated tests. We examine the compensation gap between co-CEOs and other
firm’s executives in various ways. First, we replicate the main finding of Kale, Reis, and
Venkateswaran (2009) that there is a positive relation between the compensation gap
(between CEO and VPs) and performance. Furthermore, we test whether this positive relation
is more or less pronounced for co-CEO firms. We find that the positive relation between the
compensation gap and performance is no different than that of single-CEO firms. Supporting
this finding, we also verify that the compensation gap between CEO and VPs is comparable to
the rest of the EXECUCOMP universe. This implies that co-CEO firms do not provide more
tournament incentives than single-CEO firms. We conclude that there is no evidence of a coCEO compensation gap influencing firm performance.
We also analyze pay-performance sensitivity. We find that co-CEO firms have
stronger incentive alignments relative to the rest of the EXECUCOMP universe. We measure
pay-performance sensitivity, COCEO_DELTA, as the average of (over the two co-CEOs) the
change in value of CEO’s stock option and common stock portfolio for a one-percent change
in the value of the firm’s common stock price as calculated by Core and Guay (2002). We
find that the co-CEO incentive alignment declines through the tenure of the co-CEOships that
are formed and dissolved during our sample period.
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7. Market reaction and performance effects of shared leadership
In this section we examine the market reaction surrounding the announcements of coCEO appointments and the impact that shared executive leadership exerts on firm operating
performance and valuation. Our operating performance and valuation analysis uses a matched
sample constructed on the basis of propensity scores.
7.1. Announcement period returns
If firms appoint co-CEOs when shared leadership has the potential to improve
performance as suggested by Wasserman et al. (2001) and Pearce and Conger (2003), then the
stock market should react positively to the announcement of the adoption of a co-CEO
structure. If, instead, shared leadership produces uncoordinated or poor decision-making by
the firm (Mintzberg (1989); Hackman (2002)), then the market should react negatively to coCEO announcements. The nature of the abnormal returns surrounding an announcement of a
co-CEO appointment also has implications concerning whether such an arrangement means
greater managerial entrenchment or provides mutual monitoring.
To ensure that our results capture the market reaction to only the creation of a coCEOship, we eliminate those firms that announce the co-CEO appointment in conjunction
with other news (e.g., merger, dividend change, earnings) and those that announce a new coCEO team, but are already lead by co-CEOs. Further, we lose any sample firms that fail to
announce their co-CEOships with a press release or are private in the year preceding the
announcement. Our final sample consists of 30 firms. Nevertheless, this small sample still
allows for meaningful analysis. Kothari and Warner (2007), for instance, show that for shortwindow event studies the power of the test is still high even when the observations are
between 20 and 30.
We calculate abnormal returns surrounding the announcement date by estimating the
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market model over the day -255 to day -46 window relative to the announcement date. The
market return is proxied by the CRSP value-weighted market index. We obtain similar results
when we estimate the market model with the CRSP equally-weighted market index. Table 7
presents the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for the day of the announcement
(0,0) a two-day period beginning at the announcement date (0,1), and a three-day period
centered around the announcement date (-1,1). Since ProQuest reports announcements with
the date and time at which they were originally released, we believe that the (0,0) and (0,1)
intervals provide results that are least likely to be influenced by confounding events.
The CAARs are positive and statistically significant for all three examination windows
based on the Brown and Warner (1985) test statistics.

The abnormal return for the

announcement day is 2.58%. The day (0,1) abnormal return is 2.81%, while the day (-1,1)
return is 6.19%. These results provide supporting evidence that firms appoint co-CEOs when
shared leadership is believed to be advantageous. These results are also consistent with the
mutual monitoring hypothesis.
7.2. Propensity score analysis
Using propensity score matching, we compare the expected valuation and operating
performance of a firm with co-CEOs to the expected valuation and performance that would
have been observed if the firm had a solitary CEO. Using the methodology of Dehejia and
Wahba (2002), we implement a commonly used matching algorithm: nearest neighbor
matching.

The nearest neighbor method selects n control observations with the closest

propensity score for each treatment observation. We begin by computing the propensity
scores based on Model 4 of Table 5. Next, we create three control samples based on the
nearest neighbor algorithms. We set n to 1, 4 and 6. We match the control firms with
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replacements to ensure high matching quality and stable coefficient estimates.9
As suggested by Dehejia and Wahba (2002), we estimate the treatment effect due to
the presence of co-CEOs by using weighted least squares regression. Weights are assigned
based on the number of times that a firm-year observation is matched as a control variable.10
We consider two specifications. In the first specification we regress performance measures
only on an indicator variable for the presence of co-CEOs. In the second specification we
include variables used to compute the propensity scores.
In Table 8 we present the results of weighted least squares regressions with market-tobook and return on assets as the dependent variables.

We find that co-CEO firms are

associated with higher M/B relative to a matched sample.

Regardless of the matching

algorithm and presence of the propensity covariates as additional controls, we find that the coCEO dummy is uniformly significantly positive. This result, however, is not inconsistent
with the previous finding that co-CEO mutual monitoring substitutes for other governance
mechanisms. The firm’s improved valuation might be the result of better decision-making
due to the complementary expertise of the two co-CEOs and their mutual advising. As
described earlier, 44% of our sample co-CEOships possess complementarity in both CEO
education and job responsibilities, while 45% of the co-CEOships exhibit complementarity in
either education or job responsibilities. This analysis does not, however, examine whether coCEOs are able to influence the firm’s long-term performance.
It is also important to note that performance results obtained with propensity score
9

Propensity scores for co-CEO and non-co-CEO samples overlap significantly. A high degree of overlap
provides two benefits. First, our findings become insensitive to the matching algorithm, increasing the reliability
of our conclusions. Second, due to large pool of control firm candidates, matching quality increases. We also
reconstruct our samples without allowing for replacements and re-estimate the analyses. Our findings remain
unchanged.
10
Our results are not sensitive to the weighing scheme. OLS estimations yield virtually the same results, which
are available upon request.

26

matching cannot be generalized to all firms. Evaluations based on propensity score matched
samples compare the value under co-CEO leadership to the unobserved value that would have
occurred were that firm lead by a single CEO. The improvements in valuation simply show
that firms choosing to implement shared leadership indeed benefit from it. It does not mean
that any firm that appoints co-CEOs will necessarily improve its valuation.

8. Robustness Tests
In this section we provide the results from a series of untabulated robustness checks
concerning co-CEOships. More specifically, we test to determine the effect that family and
founder status have on the likelihood of a co-CEOship as well as provide an alternative test
for endogeneity in the relation between co-CEOs and corporate governance.
8.1. Family status
Panel B of Table 1 shows that 25% of the co-CEO firms in our sample are family
businesses. This percentage is consistent with the incidence of family businesses among the
totality of U.S. public corporations noted by researchers such as Anderson and Reeb (2003)
and Gadhoum et al. (2005). This fact suggests that family status might not be a significant
determinant of co-CEOships.

To determine the extent to which family status affects the

likelihood of a co-CEOship, we add a family indicator variable equal to one when a founding
family member is on the board or owns at least 20% of the firm to the regressions presented in
Table 5.

Since the family data is hand-collected, the control sample is restricted to 500

randomly selected firms instead of the totality of the COMPUSTAT universe. We find that
the family status indicator variable is statistically insignificant across all model specifications.
All other coefficients are qualitatively identical to those presented in Table 5 with no changes
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in either their signs or significance levels.
8.2. Founder and interim co-CEOs
Panel B of Table 1 shows that 15% of co-CEOs are founders of the firm and 9% of the
co-CEOships are interim arrangements in which the old CEO and the new one temporarily
share executive responsibilities to facilitate transition. While we cannot test if the presence of
founders in the company or if succession motives are significant determinants of the decision
to appoint co-CEOs, we test if the Table 5 results are robust to the exclusions of founder and
interim co-CEOs. We find that the results presented in Table 5 hold even after eliminating all
family founder and interim co-CEOs from our sample. Therefore, we conclude that founder
or interim co-CEO firms are not responsible for the major results of this study.
8.3. Endogeneity between co-CEOships and Corporate Governance
Even though reverse causality does not appear to affect our logistic regressions due to
the one-year lag between the independent variables and the co-CEO dependent variable, the
decision to appoint co-CEOs and our governance variables (board size, percentage of
independent directors, and institutional ownership) might be related to some other underlying,
unobservable variable. To verify that this type of endogeneity does not affect our empirical
findings, we estimate a set of instrumental variable (IV) probit regressions.
Specifically, we replicate the analysis presented in Table 5 using an IV two-stage
approach to control for possible endogeneity between co-CEOship and our set of corporate
governance explanatory variables. Consistent with Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007),
we instrument our governance variables with the lagged values of these variables. We also
include the other variables originally included in the Table 5 regressions in these new
instrumented regressions.

The sign and significance of the coefficients in the second-stage
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IV probit regressions are qualitatively identical with those presented in Table 5. Overall, the
evidence offered by the IV probit regressions suggests that our results are robust to
endogeneity concerns.

9. Conclusion
This study provides a number of interesting descriptive statistics regarding the nature
of co-CEOs.

We find that the creation of co-CEOships is broadly distributed across

industries. We further note that complementarity in educational preparation or the assignment
of executive responsibilities is widespread in co-CEOships.
We find that there are several factors which are associated with the creation of a coCEOship. The most significant determinant of co-CEO appointments is M&A activity. Firms
involved in a merger will sometimes decide to appoint the CEOs of the acquirer and target as
co-CEOs of the new firm.

Additionally, consistent with Wasserman et al. (2001) we

determine that firms in which CEOs have more discretionary power as implied by lower debt
levels, higher quantities of excess cash, and greater industry concentration, are more likely to
adopt co-CEO leadership structures. Further, we discover that co-CEOs are most likely to
emerge in firms that encourage the development of powerful executives through a weak board
structure and low levels of leverage or institutional ownership. However, if CEOs have more
power in the boardroom they are less likely to share their leadership with a co-CEO.
Moreover, we show that complementarity in skills and expertise among co-CEOs
supplements board advising. We also find from a series of instrumental variable regressions
that the effect of governance on co-CEO creation is robust to possible endogeneity.
Additionally, we discover that co-CEOs are compensated proportionately less than
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solitary CEOs.

Co-CEOs are relatively less costly across all components of their

compensation: fixed salary, bonus, and option grants.

This result is inconsistent with

entrenchment effects resulting from a co-CEOship since entrenchment would likely produce
higher CEO salaries. We find that incentive pay represents a smaller percent of compensation
for co-CEOs than for single CEOs. Possibly, incentive compensation is less needed for coCEOs because of their mutual monitoring.
Finally, we examine the influence that co-CEOs have upon firm valuation and
performance. We begin by determining that the market reacts positively to the announcement
of co-CEOs, suggesting that the market capitalizes the anticipated reduction in agency costs
associated with mutual monitoring. We then describe how the presence of co-CEOs affects
corporate valuation and operating performance. Specifically, we observe that the presence of
a co-CEO has a positive impact on a firm’s market-to-book ratio, a result that is also
inconsistent with entrenchment. Since the mutual monitoring of co-CEOs substitutes for other
governance mechanisms, the impact of co-CEOships on value might be the result of their
complementary skills which supplement the advisory role of the board.
The combined evidence provided by the instrumental variable regressions, the
compensation analysis, and the market-to-book results suggests that co-CEOs can serve as an
alternative governance mechanism, with their mutual monitoring substituting for more
conventional board or external monitoring of CEOs. Co-CEO complementarity also provides
a substitute for board advising.
The importance of these findings resides in several areas. First, it establishes that there
are effective alternative leadership models to that of the solitary CEO. Our findings regarding
job and responsibility complementarity within the co-CEO team suggest that this management
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design can focus substantial strengths toward the strategic leadership of the firm. Our results
further show that the design of the senior leadership structure can reduce agency problems
between management and shareholders. The creation of a co-CEOship that can mutually
monitor represents another governance mechanism that can better align shareholder interests
with those of corporate insiders.
The evidence presented in this study is inconsistent with the premise that reduced
CEO authority leads to lower CEO effort as suggested by Stein (1988), Aghion and Tirole
(1997), and Almazan and Suarez (2003). This literature argues that most CEOs prefer to be a
solitary CEO and not part of a dual CEO arrangement. Even though the small number of coCEO firms in our sample initially appears consistent with this argument, we find for those
firms that decide to appoint co-CEOs, the resultant sharing of executive authority does not
lead to shirking by the CEOs. Finally, our results validate the continued importance of
management to the firm’s activities. Our findings are consistent with Drucker (1954) claim
that managers create, perceive, and pursue opportunities, thus accounting for differences in
organizational performance.
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Table 1
Characteristics of co-CEO Firms
This table provides descriptive statistics for the sample firms. Panel A presents the distribution of our sample
firms by industry based on one-digit SIC codes. Panel B identifies the circumstances associated with co-CEO
creation. Panel C provides univariate statistics regarding the tenure of co-CEOs. The first two rows in panel C
present co-CEO tenure at the firm level (aggregating subsequent co-CEO tenures for the same firm), at the CEO
level, and at the CEO level by motivation. Panel D provides descriptive statistics on co-CEOs’ participation to
the board as directors and chairs. Panel E and F contain data concerning the employment of co-CEOs preceding
and following their tenure as co-CEOs.
Panel A: Industry distribution
Industry

N

%

Mining and construction

3

3%

Manufacturing

33

30%

Transportation, communication, electric, gas and services

7

6%

Wholesale-retail trade

14

13%

Finance, insurance and real estate

28

25%

Services

25

23%

Public Administration

1

1%

Motivation

N

%

M&A

22

20%

Family

28

25%

Co-Founders

17

15%

Interim

10

9%

Other

34

31%

Panel B: Circumstances associated with co-CEO creation

Panel C: Co-CEO duration length (in years)
N

Mean

Median

Min

Max

All Sample - Firm Level

111

4.69

2.83

0.13

35

All Sample - CEO Level

118

4.37

2.7

0.13

32.33

Co-Founders- CEO Level

17

7.15

3.75

0.58

32.33

Family- CEO Level

26

6.71

6.58

0.58

26

Interim- CEO Level

10

1.04

0.67

0.13

3.25

Merger- CEO Level

20

2.39

1.83

0.33

9.25

Other- CEO Level

45

3.60

1.83

0.25

17

Panel D: Role of Co-CEOs on the Board of Directors (firm-year observations)
N

%

Both co-CEOs are directors

334

93%

One co-CEO is a director

13

4%

Neither co-CEO is a director

11

3%

The co-CEOs are co-Chairs of the Board

108

30%

One co-CEO is the Chair of the Board

192

54%

Neither co-CEO is the Chair of the Board

58

16%

Table 2
Descriptive overview of the educational background of co-CEOs
This table examines the highest educational achievement of co-CEOs on two dimensions: (1) educational level
and (2) field of study. Panel A presents the highest educational level for each co-CEO. Panel B lists the field of
the highest degree earned by each co-CEO. Panel C presents the highest educational level for each co-CEO pair
in the sample.
Panel A: Highest educational level of co-CEOs
Education

Number

% of non-missing

Graduate degree

104

56.52%

Undergraduate degree

74

40.22%

Some college
Some high school
Missing

3
3
73

1.63%
1.63%

Number

% of non-missing

Graduate degree
MBA
Technical
JD
Other
Missing

53
21
19
10
1

51.46%
20.39%
18.45%
9.71%

Undergraduate degree
Business
Technical
Other
Missing

27
12
20
15

44.76%
20.34%
33.90%

Number

% of non-missing

28
48
16
14
3
9

25.69%
44.04%
14.68%
12.84%
2.75%

Panel B: Field of study for highest educational level of co-CEOs
Education

Panel C: Highest educational level of co-CEO pairs
Education
Both co-CEOs have graduate degree
One co-CEO has graduate degree
Both co-CEOs have undergraduate degree
One co-CEO has undergraduate degree
Neither co-CEO has university degree
Both missing

Table 3
Complementarity in fields of study and the assignment of duty of co-CEOs
This table examines the extent to which there are differences in assignments of duty and fields of study
(measured at the beginning of the co-CEO appointment) between a co-CEO team. Each pair of co-CEO is treated
as a single observation. Assignment of duty is classified as complementary if co-CEOs have different
responsibilities. Field of study is classified as complementary if one of the co-CEO has at least one different
degree than those of the other co-CEO. Due to data limitations, Panel A, B and C are based on 67, 86 and 54 coCEO firms.

Panel A: The extent of complementarity in the field of study
Number of firms
Percentage of firms

Complementary

Uncomplementary

50

17

74.63%

25.37%

Panel B: The extent of complementarity in the assignment of co-CEO responsibilities
Number of firms
Percentage of firms

Complementary

Uncomplementary

54

32

62.79%

37.21%

Panel C: Complementarity based on field of study and assignment of co-CEO responsibilities
Assignment of co-CEO responsibilities n (%)
Field of study
n (%)

Complementary
Uncomplementary

Complementary

Uncomplementary

23 (42.59%)
8 (14.81%)

17 (31.48%)
6 (11.11%)

Table 4
Univariate Analysis of the Determinants of a co-CEO Structure
This table presents a univariate comparison of possible determinants of a co-CEOship. The sample period is 1998-2008. MVE is the market value of equity in $
millions (item #19*item#25). D is the ratio of long-term debt to book value of assets (item #9/item #6). FCF is the free-cash flow scaled by the book value of
assets ([item #13- item #16 – item #15 – item #19 – item #21+Δitem #35]/item #6). CEOPOWER equals 1 if the CEO is the only insider on board, otherwise 0.
ADVISINGBOARD equals 1 if only a minority of independent board members serve on at least two of the three major committees of the board (audit,
compensation and nominating). PERINDEP is the proportion of independent board members on the board. INSTOWN is the proportion of institutional
ownership. SEGNUM is the number of business segments. HERF is a revenue-based Herfindahl index computed at 3-digit SIC level.

Variable

MVE
D
FCF
CEOPOWER
ADVISINGBOARD
PERINDEP
INSTOWN
SEGNUM
HERF

co-CEO Sample
(1)

Medians
(Means are
provided
for dummy
variables)
387.47
0.1201
0.0472
0.3916
0.4414
0.5556
0.4136
2.0000
0.1538

N

334
332
313
332
333
333
334
289
334

co-CEO Sample
(without M&A)
(2)
Medians
(Means are
provided
for dummy
variables)
336.83
0.0943
0.0524
0.4118
0.4180
0.5714
0.4136
1.0000
0.1573

N

256
254
240
255
256
255
256
224
256

COMPUSTAT Sample
(3)
Medians
(Means are
provided
for dummy
variables)
117.95
0.0827
0.0218
0.5225
0.6316
0.7000
0.2314
1.0000
0.1126

p-values for differences
in medians (or means when
reported)

(3-1)

(3-2)

0.0000
0.0055
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0183
0.0037

0.0000
0.1399
0.0001
0.0004
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.4056
0.0008

N

73,843
73,391
71,417
21,583
21,583
21,583
73,843
62,585
73,843

Table 5
Multivariate Analyses of the Determinants of a co-CEOship
This table presents a panel-data logistic analysis of the determinants of a co-CEOship. The sample period is 1998-2008. The dependent variable equals 1 when
the firm has two CEOs, otherwise 0. The independent variables are lagged by one year (t-1). LOGMVE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity in $
millions (item #19*item#25. D is the ratio of long-term debt to book value of assets (item #9/item #6). SEGNUM is the number of business segments. FCF is the
free-cash flow scaled by the book value of assets ([item #13- item #16 – item #15 – item #19 – item #21+Δitem #35]/item #6). HERF is a revenue-based
Herfindahl index computed at 3-digit SIC level. CEOPOWER equals 1 if the CEO is the only insider on board, otherwise 0. ADVISINGBOARD equals 1 if only a
minority of independent board members serve on at least two of the three major committees of the board (audit, compensation and nominating). PERINDEP is
the proportion of independent board members on the board. INSTOWN is the proportion of institutional ownership. MERGER_ACTIVITY equals 1 if the firm
acquires a firm over the past three fiscal years, otherwise 0. SOX is set to one if the firm-year observation corresponds to post-SOX period, otherwise zero.

Independent Variables
Intercept
LOGMVEt-1
Dt-1
SEGNUMt-1
FCFt-1
HERFt-1
CEOPOWERt-1
ADVISINGBOARDt-1
PERINDEPt-1
INSTOWNt-1
MERGER_ACTIVITYt-1
SOX
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
N
Pseudo R2

Model 1
p-value
Estimate
1.2656
0.0002
-0.4333
0.0000
-1.2330
0.0003
-0.1086
0.0094
0.7149
0.0836
0.6829
0.0819
-0.5339
0.0007
-0.8781
0.0000
-1.6990
0.0000
-3.1472
0.0000
0.9329
0.0000

Model 2
Estimate
p-value
0.9599
0.0078
-0.4347
0.0000
-1.3561
0.0001
-0.1162
0.0065
0.3535
0.3771
0.7890
0.0486
-0.4961
0.0020
-0.9867
0.0000
-1.3512
0.0010
-3.1012
0.0000
0.8810
0.0000

Model 3
Estimate
p-value
1.1930
0.0010
-0.4316
0.0000
-0.9268
0.0095
-0.1281
0.0022
0.7895
0.0773
0.8323
0.0372
-0.5056
0.0016
-0.9089
0.0000
-1.5312
0.0002
-3.2756
0.0000
0.9519
0.0000

Model 4
Estimate
p-value
0.7401
0.0525
-0.4372
0.0000
-1.0007
0.0069
-0.1443
0.0008
0.3921
0.3599
1.0336
0.0118
-0.4425
0.0069
-1.0589
0.0000
-0.9674
0.0238
-3.2123
0.0000
0.8432
0.0000

Model 5
Estimate
p-value

No
No
16,175
0.224

No
Yes
16,175
0.238

Yes
No
16,175
0.261

Yes
Yes
16,175
0.279

Yes
No
16,175
0.264

1.1136
-0.4283
-0.9412
-0.1336
0.6528
0.9214
-0.4320
-0.9860
-1.2234
-3.1803
0.8856
-0.4686

0.0022
0.0000
0.0088
0.0014
0.1395
0.0222
0.0078
0.0000
0.0041
0.0000
0.0000
0.0025

Table 6
Comparative Compensation Analysis between Solitary and co-CEOs
This table presents a univariate analysis of CEO compensation for our sample firms. The “Solitary CEO”
statistics refer to compensation for our sample firms in the two years preceding and following a co-CEO’s
tenure. The “co-CEOs” statistics refer to the CEO compensation for our sample firms during the co-CEO tenure.
Total cash compensation (TOTALCASHCOMP) is the sum of salary (SALARY) and bonus (BONUS) measured in
dollars. GRANTS is the dollar value of new stock grants. OPTIONS is the number of new option grants. Total
cash compensation, salary, bonus, and grants are reported in 2000 dollars. Panel A presents the sum of the
compensation figures for the two CEOs. Panel B presents compensation figures on an individual basis.
Panel A: Aggregate Compensation
Solitary CEO

p-values of
differences

co-CEOs

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

TOTALCASHCOMP

969,424

489,385

1,823,936

972,497

0.000

0.000

SALARY

454,182

347,545

800,839

633,288

0.000

0.000

BONUS

510,845

119,663

988,572

181,623

0.009

0.071

GRANTS

352,131

0

262,753

0

0.326

0.011

OPTIONS

373,811

70,000

340,779

25,000

0.749

0.013

Number of Firms

85

Panel B: Individual Compensation
Solitary CEO

p-values of
differences

co-CEOs

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

TOTALCASHCOMP

969,424

489,385

911,968

486,248

0.645

0.095

SALARY

454,182

347,545

400,420

316,644

0.069

0.014

BONUS

510,845

119,663

494,286

90,811

0.880

0.263

GRANTS

352,131

0

131,377

0

0.001

0.005

OPTIONS

373,811

70,000

170,389

12,500

0.008

0.000

Number of Firms

85

Table 7
Abnormal Announcement Returns
This table presents abnormal announcement returns of firms announcing a switch from a classic single CEO
leadership structure to a co-CEO structure. We calculate the abnormal announcement returns by means of a
market model with an estimation period of 255 days that terminates 46 days before the announcement. We
exclude firms that announce the initiation of a co-CEOship in combination with other events (merger, dividend
change or initiation, etc.). The market returns used in the model are the CRSP value-weighted returns. CAAR is
the cumulative average abnormal return, Z-statistic is based on Patell (1976) test, and t-statistic is adjusted for
time series correction of Brown and Warner (1985).
Event window
(0,0)
(0,1)
(-1,1)

N
30
30
30

CAAR
2.58%
2.81%
6.19%

Z-statistic
2.711
2.065
3.626

t-statistic
2.568
1.975
3.558

Table 8
Operating Performance and co-CEOs
This table examines valuation and operating performance differences between co-CEO and non-co-CEO firms
using matched samples. Matching is based on propensity scores computed as the predicted probabilities of
establishing co-CEO stewardship based on nearest neighbor matching. Matching is done on the common support
of the propensity scores. For brevity the coefficient estimates for co-CEO dummy (α1) from the following
weighted least squares regressions are reported:
M/Bt = α0 + α1COCEO_DUMt + ε
[1]
M/Bt = α0 + α1COCEO_DUMt + α X + ε
[2]
ROAt = α0 + α1COCEO_DUMt + ε
[3]
ROAt = α0 + α1COCEO_DUMt + α X + ε
[4]
Valuation, M/B, is measured as the natural logarithm of market to book ratio computed as the ratio of market
value of assets to book value of assets ([item #6 - item #60 + item #74 + item #19*item#25]/item #6). Operating
performance, ROA, is measured as the ratio of operating income before depreciation to book value of assets
(item #13/item #6). COCEO_DUMt equals to 1 when the firm has two CEOs, otherwise equals to 0. X denotes
the vector of covariates used to compute the propensity scores in Model 4 of Table 5. Weights are assigned
based on the number of occurrences for each matched firm-year observation.

Equation
[1] M/B
[2] M/B
[3] ROA
[4] ROA
Number of treated observations
Number of matched observations

n=1
α1
0.3009
0.1993
-0.0159
-0.0166

p-value
0.0000
0.0000
0.1864
0.0719
241
241

Nearest neighbor (n)
n=4
α1
p-value
0.3009
0.0000
0.1973
0.0000
-0.0159
0.1403
-0.0125
0.1362
241
964

n=6
α1
0.3009
0.1980
-0.0159
-0.0121
241
1,446

p-value
0.0000
0.0000
0.1348
0.1461

